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The Game Theoretic Approach to H ∞ Optimal Control . . . . . . . . . 2–21
P. Bernhard
Abstract
The Control design problems with H ∞ bounds are considered.
Given a plant y = Gu (in the classical problem it is assumed linear stationary, but
we shall not need stationarity), devise a feedback control u = Ky which shall make
the sensitivity transfer function T = (I + GK)−1 small, in order to be robust, i.e.
resistant against model errors in G. The natural meaning of ”small”, to engineers,
refers to the maximum value of (the norm of) T (iω) over all frequencies, i.e. the
H∞ norm of T , which has to lie in the Hardy space H∞ in order for the closed
loop system to be stable. Further, for measurement noise insensitivity it would be
desirable that the complementary sensitivity function Tc = GK(I + GK)
−1 also
be small. However, since T + Tc = 1, it is impossible to make both small at a
time. The solution to this dilemma is to realize that modelling errors introduce low
frequency disturbances, while measurement errors tend to be high frequency. Hence,
the idea of loop shaping whereby one attempts to control the magnitude of T , say,
at low frequencies, and of Tc at high frequencies. This is usually done by defining
weighting functions W (s) and Wc(s), and controlling the norm of the combined
transfer function H = [WT WcTc].
Building on that idea, many more refined problems have been defined, attempt-
ing also, for instance, to control the input activity transfer function K(I +GK)−1,
and so on. Provided that the various weighting functions be taken as rational,
sometimes with care to the properness of the various systems involved, all these
problems may be cast into the standard problem described below.
We offer a slightly different rationale for the current approach, still related to
robustness, but closer to the min max approach we adopt here.
On a Mix Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23–31
A.Y. Garnaev
Abstract
We consider the following non-zero-sum two-person game. Each of the two play-
ers draws a number according to a bivariate distribution on [0,1]. After observing
his number each player can then chose to offer or not offer to exchange his number
for the other players number. Conditions for an exchange are the following: (1)
both players must offer for a trade to occur with certainty; (2) if only one player
offers, a trade occurs with probability p. A players payoff is the number he holds
after a possible exchange has occurred. Also, a two-stage variant of this game is
considered. The optimal strategies of the players are described.
The Game Theoretic Approach to a Problem of Environmental
Pollution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33–39
O.A. Malafeyev and V.V. Popov
Abstract
The process of pollution propagation in the air due to the wind is considered.
There are pollutant sources of different strength located in a finite number of points
of a region D. Some two-player games arising in this context are considered. Player
1, by the choice of sources and strength coordinates the pollution emission in an
attempt to maximize the quantity of sediments falling over the region X. The aim
of a player 2 is opposite. Various statements of this problem are considered. An
example is solved.
The Solution of Russian Black Jack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41–46
V.V. Mazalov
Abstract
The article contains the solution of the well-known game Black Jack (Russian
variant). In the game in the pack of 36 cards each card corresponds to some number
of points: jack-2, queen-3, king- 4, ace-11 and to any other card the number
marked on it. There are two players taking some cards and calculating the sums
of corresponding points. If the sums of corresponding points are less or equal to 21
then the player having the largest sum of the points is the winner. If the sum of
only one of the players is more than 21 then his opponent wins. In other cases a
draw is declared. The mathematical model of the game and optimal stopping rules
for both players are developed in the article.
The Time Consistency (Dynamic Stability) in Differential Games with a
Discount Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47–53
L.A. Petrosjan
Abstract
The author proposes a family of strongly time consistent optimality principles
(STCOP) for cooperative differential games. Using the regularizing procedure differ-
ent STCOPs based on core, Shapley value, NMsolution are obtained. Two different
approaches are considered. The first is based on the construction of a new charac-
teristic function (and finally constructing an integral optimality principle) and in
the second one an imputation distribution procedure which leads to the differential
strongly time-consistent optimality principle is defined. Also the author considers
the problem of strong time-consistency for the case of the nperson differential games
with discount payoffs on the infinite time horizon.
Upper Estimation of the Value of Differential Game with Information
Time Lag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55–65
T.V. Slobodinskaya
Abstract
The goal of this paper is to show possible approaches of obtaining the upper
estimations of the value of differential games with incomplete information. The
simple pursuit zero-sum games with prescribed duration T on the plane between
the team of pursuers P = P1,...,Pm and the evader E are considered. Both players
receive an information about the opponents position with time lag. The upper
estimations of the values of two differential games with different payoff functions
are obtained and the corresponding pure piecewise constant strategies of the pursuer
are described. It is shown how to calculate the minimal number of the pursuers, who
can provide the payoff of the player E not exceeding a given number V. Stochastic
covers of the reachable sets of the player E are used and the corresponding mixed
piecewise constant strategy of the player P is described.
Approximate Nash Strategies and Suboptimal Team Solutions in Markov
Chains with Weakly Coupled Decision Makers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67–84
R. Srikant and T. Basar
Abstract
Control of Markov chains by a team of agents is a challenging problem both in
the team and game situations. In the team case, if the decision makers (DMs) have
access only to imperfect-state information, and they exchange this information at
every step (i.e., both DMs have common information) or if the underlying infor-
mation pattern is of the one-step delay type, dynamic programming arguments can
be used to obtain the optimal policies. But one has to redefine the Markov chain
on an appropriate uncountably infinite state space, corresponding to the sufficient
statistics for the problem, before obtaining the optimal solution. If the delay in in-
formation exchange is more than one step, then the problem falls in the category of
stochastic control problems with nonclassical information patterns, the challenging
aspects of which were first pointed out by it H. S. Witsenhausen (1968).
Of course, in the extreme (special) case when the transition probability matrix is
block diagonal, with each block controlled by only one decision maker, the problem
becomes tractable, since it can (trivially) be decomposed into single decision maker
Markov chain control problems, each one of which can be solved independently.
If there is a strong interaction between the blocks, however, the problem becomes
quite intractable.
We study the intermediate case when the interaction between the blocks of the
transition probability matrix is weak, specifically O(), where  is a small parameter.
By exploiting this weak coupling between the blocks, it is then possible to obtain
the optimal solution, provided that the value of  is sufficiently small.
Game Theoretic Model of the Tax Inspection Organization . . . . . . 85–96
A.A. Vasin and O. Agapova
Abstract
This paper discusses a model of tax inspection activity in order to determine the
optimal strategy of its organization. We shall consider the following description of
interaction among Businessmen, Inspectors and the Center. At the first stage every
Businessman is to report to the Center whole sum of his income. In reporting he
can either show real sum of the income or show his income below real in order to
reduce the tax value. At the second stage every Inspector checks at random some
of Businessmen attached to him for a given period. Then the Inspector informs
the Center about the established incomes of these Businessmen. This information
may be either valid or not. At the third stage the Center checks randomly some of
inspectors. Depending on inspection results the Center fines Businessmen exposed
of tax evasion as well as Inspectors exposed of bribery or extortion. The information
from unchecked Businessmen and Inspectors is treated as valid. We assume that
the Center’s checking is always correct.
Proceeding from this description the present paper gives a model of tax inspec-
tion activity. The paper gives a game theoretic analysis of this interaction in order
to determine the optimal values of the above mentioned parameters.
Stackelberg Differential Games and the Problem of Time
Consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97–103
V.V. Zakharov
Abstract
A Stackelberg differential game with one leader and n followers is treated. Stack-
elberg leadership in dynamic games leads to the time inconsistency of optimal pol-
icy. To overcome time inconsistency the author proposes to consider t-transferable
games. In this type of games optimal value of payoffs of the players are redistributed
along the optimal path. A method of regularization (redistribution of payoffs) of
the Stackelberg game is proposed. Necessary conditions for time consistency are
formulated.
Two Person Stopping Games with Priority for One of
the Players . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105–111
E.Z. Ferenstein
Abstract
An infinite-horizon version of the game investigated by E. G. Enns and the
author for the case of a finite possible number of observations is considered. In this
article the author obtains a theorem on the existence of an equilibrium point. A
specific game related to the best choice problem with full information is investigated
also where an explicit form of an equilibrium point is found.
One Approach to the construction of the Time Consistent Optimality
Principles in N-Person Differential Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113–120
D.V. Kuzutin
Abstract
Some optimality principles used in differential games with many players are
the attempts of compromise on the set of Pareto-optimal (weak Pareto-optimal)
payoffs. An equitable choice of unique solution from these sets may be realized by
using known results and methods of the theory of bargaining [1]. Unfortunately, the
majority of obtained in this way optimality principles are time inconsistent. Here
we offer one approach to the construction of time consistent Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution in n-person differential games with integral payoffs.
Single-Sector Stochastic Model of Economics with Perfect
Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121–128
O.A. Malafeyev and S.A. Nemnyugin
Abstract
In this paper we shall construct two classes of single-sector stochastic models
of economics with perfect competition. The first one is created by inclusion of the
stochastic evolution of exogenous variables into the well known deterministic model.
The perfect competition requires maximization of the income at any moment. The
resulting linear stochastic differential equation may be solved by standard methods.
The second approach is formulated in terms of the stochastic control. It requires
optimization of the stochastic income functional with the supposition that exogenous
variables follows stochastic differential equation. This problem may be solved by
dynamic programming method. Scheme of investigation and possible generalizations
are discussed.
Game-Theoretic Model of Preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129–137
V.V. Mazalov
Abstract
The following game P may be proposed as a simple model of preference. Suppose
that two players, I and II, receive cards x and y, respectively. The card z is dealt to
the pile. The random variables x, y, z are independent and uniformly distributed at
the interval [0,1]. In the first step, Player I has two possibilities. First, he may take
the card from the pile, keep the card with the greater value, and discard the card
with the lower value to the discard pile. Then the players open their cards. If the
value of Player Is card exceeds the value of Player IIs card, Player I then receives
quantity A from Player II; if the value of Player Is card is less than Player IIs card,
then Player I pays quantity B to Player II; if the values of the cards are equal, there
is no payment. The second possibility in the first step is that Player I can say pass;
the game then goes over to the second player.
In the second step, Player II also has two possibilities. Player II may take the
card from the pile, keep the card with the greater value and discard the card with
the lower value. After Player II does so, the players open their cards. If the value
of Player IIs card exceeds the value of Player Is card, Player II receives quantity A
from Player I; if the value of Player IIs card is less than the value of Players I card,
Player II pays Player I of quantity B; if the values are equal, there is no payment.
The second possibility in the second step is that Player II may say pass. In this
case the pile remains reserved, the players open their cards and now the situation
is reversed. At this point the player wins who has the lower value. In other words,
if x¡y, Player I receives quantity C from Player II; if x¿y, Player I pays quantity C
to Player II; and, finally, if x=y, there is a draw.
We determine the optimal strategies in this game.
Game-Theoretic Model of Technology Cartels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139–153
M.L. Petit and B. Tolwinski
Abstract
We consider game-theoretic model of technology cartels. The model is formal-
ized as a discrete-time infinite horizon dynamic game with non-linear demand and
non-linear learning functions. We compute collusive as well as noncooperative so-
lutions. The latter are defined as feedback Nash (subgame perfect) equilibria. The
solutions presented in the paper correspond to a wide range of parameter values
and, therefore, provide a good insight into the behavior of firms sharing technical
knowledge and into the impact that the creation of a TSC can have on industrial
concentration and social welfare.
Integral and Differential Principles in N-Person Differential
Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155–168
L.A. Petrosjan
Abstract
In the paper the cooperative differential games with prescribed duration are
considered. It is well known that solution concepts taken from classical coopera-
tive static game theory are time-inconsistent and the multi-value solutions are also
strongly time inconsistent. The author proposes two methods for regularization
of this solutions to insure strongly time consistency. One is based on integration
of classical solutions along the so called cooperative trajectory the other uses as
solution locally optimal behaviors. The proposed regularization requires in both
cases different transformation procedures for corresponding classical characteristic
functions.
Information Structures and Perfect Information in Simply
Exchange Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169–186
M. Sakaguchi
Abstract
The two-person simple exchange game (SEG) is described as follows: Each of
two players (I and II) draws a number (x and y, respectively) according to a uniform
distribution on [0, 1]. After observing his number each player can then choose either
to keep (K) his number or to exchange (E) it for the other player’s number. If only
one player chooses E, an exchange of the numbers occurs with probability p. A
player’s payoff is the number he holds after the players have made their choices and
a possible exchange has occurred. In the present paper we shall investigate SEGs
in which one or both of the players have various patterns of information-private
or public-about his own and opponent’s hands. We shall also discuss three-person
SEG, as a natural extension of the two-person game-model.
The Properties of Controls in Pursuit Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187–192
N.M. Slobozhanin
Abstract
A pursuit game with one pursuer P and one evader E is considered. E is moving
from the origin of the coordinate system O on the plane, checked by straight lines
(the lattice with the side of unit length), motion taking place only along the lattice.
Two properties of controls in pursuit games are considered in the paper. On the
first property: its essence is that in the wide class of pursuit games optimal strategy
exists only for the evader. In this case the game in which the phase space and
dynamics of the player P is analogous with player E is considered. We prove that
in this game for any ξ ¿ 0 there exists the situation of ξ-equilibrium and optimal
behavior strategy of player E. On the second property: the phase space of the player
E is the same but the dynamic is different. Necessary and sufficient conditions for
optimal strategy of the player E are received.
Stackelberg Optimality and Environment Protection . . . . . . . . . . 193–199
V.V. Zakharov
Abstract
In this paper we study a game-theoretical approach to the problem of protecting
the environment against pollution by harmful industrial wastes or other sources of
pollution. This approach is illustrated by an example of pollution of a region by
several enterprises; here is assumed that they are guided by different interests in
the implementation of arrangements for protecting the natural environment against
pollution.
A static hierarchical model is considered in which the payoffs of the leader (au-
thority) and the players-followers (enterprises) depend on the total discharge and
individual (for the enterprises) discharges of pulluting substances, the question of
the existence of a Stackelberg sollution in pure strategies is investigated, and method
for finding solutions is proposed.
A dynamical model is constructed on the basis of a partial differential equation
that describes the spreading of a polluting substance. The payoff functionals of
the players depend on the level of pollution and intensity of discharge of earch of
the sources. For dynamical model problem of time consistency of the cooperative
solution is investigated and method of regularization of this solution is proposed.
A Game-Theoretic Model of Divisible Good Bargaining of the Divisible
Goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201–207
N.A. Zenkevich and S.N. Voznyuk
Abstract
The paper deals with a two-player bargaining situation in which a limited quan-
tity of goods (with given minimal price) is to be distributed and the sum of players’
demands is higher than the disposable quantity of goods. The strategies of players,
described by the offered prices, lead to the result satisfying first the demand of the
higher bid. The existence of the Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimum in a corre-
sponding bimatrix game modeling the described bargaining is proved. An analytic
condition is derived under which the special type of Nash equilibrium exists and the
Pareto optimum is unique in pure strategies.
